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Kant's Dubious Disciples: Hare and Rawls
by Edward Papa
The aim of this paper is to show that Kant's Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals has set a basic pattern of research for moral philosophy,
a pattern established by the structure of the text, and one which implies an
overarching thesis. The Groundwork is divided into three sections: (1) an
analysis of ordinary moral judgments which identifies their formal rule, (2)
the derivation of the supreme principle of morality, and (3) the presentation
of a theory of reason which grounds the possibility of moral action. Kant
seeks to explain the sense in which moral action may be said to manifest
transcendental freedom: regardless of what may be the case in the world
investigated by science, it is, Kant argues, both theoretically possible and
practically necessary to afflrIll the idea of freedom.
The question of the manner in which contemporary moral philosophers
such as Hare and Rawls continue the Kantian project has been much
disputed. But philosophers identify themselves as Kantians, but the mean-
ing of this identification is obscure since they are opposed in so many
seemingly fundamental respects. Rawls is a deontologist, Hare adefender
of utilitarianism. Rawls employs a basically empiricistic method; Hare
denies that such methods are adequate for moral theory. What meaning
could the Kantian epithet have beyond these determinations? The answer,
I will suggest, is that it signifies a model of theory-construction patterned
after Kant's Groundwork. Kant's Groundwork represents an ordered series
of questions. These questions direct the human being to discover the
grounds ofmoral determination within. By contrasting in some manner the
"within" ofthe moral standpoint from the "without" ofthe standpoint ofthe
world, Hare and Rawls retain something ofKant's notion oftranscendental
freedom. Yet neither conceives transcendental freedom in the metaphysical
manner of Kant as signifying a domain which is in principle closed to
empirical inquiry. For Hare and Rawls the moral standpoint is a purely
formal determination, not in Kant's sense of constituting grounds for moral
action regardless of the state of the world, hut merely in the sense of
constituting a pattern of thought that can be employed regardless of the
state of the world.
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After establishing the sense in which Rare and Rawls are properly
classified as Kantians both with respect to the structure and general aims
of their theories, the differences between them are specified in terms of the
way in which they respond to charges of formalism. It is then argued that
their theories fail to support the core Kantian doctrine of the autonomy of
the moral subject. Finally, proposals are made concerning the requirements
forthe success ofthe Groundwork project, namely, how a positive conception
of the autonomous subject may be maintained even while this subject is
understood as rooted in the world.
I
Kant's ostensive aim in the Groundwork is to vindicate what he takes to
be the common belief in the objectivity of the moral judgment. The three
parts of the Groundwork are ordered toward this objective. With the
completion ofthe third part, Kant shows how morality, properly understood,
can be rationa11y justified.
Part one of the Groundwork begins with an analysis of the moral
judgment and is complete with the identification of the categorical impera-
tive as the formal condition of moral reasoning. Since the categorical
imperative is the formal structure that judgments or, more generally, acts
must exhibit to be moral, to justify moral judgments and actions is to show
that their principles, or maxims, in Kant's language, possess this form. The
objectivity of moral principles consists in their conformity to laws grasped
as necessary by reason. An objective moral principle is one that is valid for
rational nature as such. The justification of moral principles consists in
showing that acting on them is demanded by reason (G 400 fn.).! Since
human beings are not perfectly rational, we can conclude that an act is
required by reason per se rather than by another, perhaps antagonistic,
motive only if it is done for duty's sake. In a11 other cases the act may in
fact be ordered to the attainment of some end constituted by man's natural
impulses or desires (G, 397-99). Kant's analysis ofthe moraljudgment links
the notion of acting for the sake of duty with acting on maxims that can be
willed to be universallaw, and both are understood in terms of the will's
being abstracted from a11 motivation that lies outside its conformity with
the requirements of reason.
But to specify moral action as action done for the sake of duty is not to
reveal the full content of the moral law. The task of the second section of
1 All page references to the Groundwork will be made in the body of the paper, with
the Groundwork abbreviated by "G," and follow the standard pagination ofthe Berlin
Academy edition. The translations are those of J. J. Paton (New York: Harper and
Row, 1964). The primary texts of Hare and Rawls I also refer to in the body of the
paper. These are Hare's Moral Thinking ("MT) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
and Rawls's Theory ofJustice ("TJ") (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971). All other references will be found in the note§~
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the Groundwork is to articulate the moraliawas a principle of autonomy.
Kant conceives duty as a requirement of reason imposed upon recalcitrant
sensible nature (G 404-05). Sensible nature tempts us to restriet the
function ofreason in informing action to hypothetical or means-end thinking
and to pursue ends constituted by sources external to the will. In testing
maxims for their conformity to the moral law, Kant reHes most heavily on
the formulation ofthe categorical imperative which demands that a maxim
must be capable ofserving as a law ofnature (G, 421). Amaxim can fail the
test ofuniversallaw in two ways: either (1) its universaHzation is self-con-
tradictory and we cannot conceive of a system of nature which contains it
as law; or (2) while self-consistent in the sense ofconceivable within a system
of nature, its universalization cannot be rationally willed. Since conformity
to rational nature is the rule of moral action, and since Kant identifies
rational nature with the autonomous will, the final implication to be drawn
from the categorical imperative is "the Idea of the will ofevery rational being
as a will which makes universallaw" (G, 431).
Although as an imperative the moral law appears external to our
imperfectly rational nature, it is in fact the issue of our reason. The idea
that every rational being, as rational, is the author of universallaw follows
directly from the categorical imperative. Imperatives are either hypotheti-
calor categorical. Since all hypothetical imperatives determine the will
heteronomously, categorical imperatives must be authored by the will itself.
Autonomy, Kant concludes, is "the sole principle of ethics" (G, 440). Since
the task of ethics is to determine what the morallaw requires, this amounts
to determining the requirements of autonomous reason.
Still, Kant cautions against drawing substantive conclusions from an
analysis of the meaning of morality. While the actual respects in which we
are subject to sensible determination are properly items of scientific knowl-
edge, the basis on which we may assert the autonomy of the will is unclear.
A philosophieal analysis of the meaning of morality does not establish that
moral conduct is areal possibility for human life (cf. G, 445). To establish
this possibility is the task of the third section of the Groundwork. Kant
seeks to show that moral conduct is possible on the basis ofa theory ofreason
which accounts for the fact that human nature is both sensibly conditioned
and practically free.
Kant has shown that the concept of the morallaw includes the idea of
self-authorship. Furthermore, this implies, Kant argues, that the idea of
freedom must ground the concept of autonomy. By definition, an autono-
mous will is free in a negative sense, free from "determination by alien
causes" (G, 446). But reason has insight, Kant claims, into its own activity
in a positive sense as well, since it must consider itself to be the author of
the morallaw. The will is thus perceived as a law unto itself, but only when
it avoids heteronomous determination and therefore when its own structur-
ing principle is universallaw. Kant therefore concludes that "a free will and
a will under morallaws are one and the same" (G, 447).
This is not, of course, to deny that we are also conditioned by sense. But
Kant argues that the standpoint by which we conceive ourselves as free can
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and must be distinguished from the standpoint we adopt when we view our
actions merely as observed events (G, 450-52). As imperfectly rational
agents, we are participants in two worlds: we belong to a purely intelligible
world through our power of reason, apower capable of producing ideas
transcending anything which could be contributed to the understanding by
sense, and we belong to the sensible world in which we are determined by
natural causes. Insofar as we exist under the laws of nature we are
heteronomously determined, but insofar as we also belong to the intelligible
world, and so exist under laws which "have their ground in reason alone,"
we have grounds to assert our freedom (G, 452). Since we are neither
perfectly rational nor completely determined by sense, we "recognize," as
Kant says, "the autonomy ofthe will together with its consequence-moral-
ity," and we recognize autonomy to be an "obligation" which we do not, as
sensible creatures, by nature fulfill (G, 453). Our dual determination, then,
shows freedom to be possible. For the purposes of moral action, this dual
determination provides sufficient reason to afflrIIl the principle ofautonomy.
Once the theoretical possibility of freedom is vindicated, Kant's final
point is not only that we make this possibility real in moral action but that
it is necessary to do so ifwe wish to give evidence of our rational nature (G,
461). Although Kant does not offer his argument as knowledge of the
intelligible world of reason (knowledge for us must be confined to the
sensible world), nonetheless, insofar as we adopt the moral point of view we
affJ.rIIl our freedom by conceiving our wills as obedient to laws having their
ground in reason alone. The positive freedom implicit in our authorship of
the moral law justifies our belief in our autonomy. Autonomy, thus con-
ceived, is not part of a description of the self but a principle necessarily
affirmed in moral conduct.
11
Hare's moral philosophy provides a linguistic foundation for Kant's claim
that moral conduct evidences transcendental freedom. The three-stage
argumentative sequence constitutive of Kant's Groundwork is pursued in
Hare's trilogy of moral philosophy: The Language of Morals, Freedom and
Reason, and Moral Thinking. Each work emphasizes one ofthe parts ofthe
Groundwork. Like Kant, Hare begins with an analysis of the moral judg-
ment in order to identify its formal rule. Hare argues that while moral
judgments are not independent of the preferences of those who formulate
them, they nonetheless have cognitive content. The use of moral concepts
to express our preferences commits us to specific lines of conduct.
The logic of moral concepts is summed up in the requirement that moral
judgments express universal prescriptions. Moral judgments are prescrip-
tions insofar as their primary function is to guide choice rather than to
merely describe what is the case. But moral judgments are not properly
analyzed as imperatives since their purpose is to guide choice on the basis
of object reasons. Objective reasons for making a pa~j~_1.!~~~_!!!~!~)_~hQi~~_---
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are contained in the principles which specify the relevant standard ofvalue
for preferences of a given kind. The objectivity of principles turns on their
universalizability; principles constitute reasons for choosing something or
acting in a particular way which purport to be valid for anyone in similar
circumstances. Moral judgments not only express a preference for some-
thing, but commend that preference to others on the basis of standards
which the other presumably acknowledges. With this analysis of the moral
judgment, Hare believes hirnself to have articulated a basically Kantian
conception ofthe moral judgment as irreducibly prescriptive and at the same
time objective because universalizable (cf. MT, 4).
At the same time, Hare rejects Kant's contention that moral principles
are categorical imperatives. Moral principles, for Hare, do not constitute
objective reasons for action independently of those ends which can be
attained through them. For Hare, states of affairs as weIl as actions may
be subsumed under moral principles since these principles articulate rea-
sons not merely for what should be done, but also for what rationally should
be the case. Consequently, there is room in Hare's moral system for
consequentialist moral principles, and indeed such principles take pride of
place.
Although Hare insists that the analysis of moral terms be carried out
independently of the question of the substantive principle of morality, he at
the same time contends that utility is the fIrst principle of morality on the
basis of an analysis of moral terms. Utility occupies roughly the place in
Hare's theory that Kant a110cates to the categorical imperative. Like Kant,
Hare believes that the identification ofthe supreme principle ofmorality is
a matter of analysis. The employment ofmorallanguage, according to Hare,
commits us to actions which maximize the satisfaction of desires of a11
persons affected equally-as Bentham put it, "Everyone to count for one, no
one to count for more than one" (cf. MT, 4).
The core of Hare's method for normative ethics consists in the imagina-
tive representation of the preferences of all persons affected by a given act.
The difference between a prescription for myself in a particular situation
and a moraljudgment is a thought-process where the preferences of a11 those
affected by the proposed judgment are considered one by one and weighed
according to intensity of preference. Mter criticism by logic and the facts-
the logic which directs us to consider the preferences of others equa11y with
our own and the facts about those preferences-the objectively right moral
judgment is that which tries to maximize the satisfaction of preferences.
Since the requirement of universalizability entails that identical judgments
be made about a11 cases identical in their universal properties (MT, 108),
the standpoint ofthe individual who makes the judgment cannot be relevant
in framing the judgment. Each person's preferences are relevant, hut only
in their universal features. Because universalizahility precludes giving the
perspective of the actual individual "I" more weight than the perspective of
any other "1," the representation of the perspective of another is the
hypothetical identification with the other as another "I." To represent
another fu11y to myself, alheit in imagination, is to adopt the other's
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motivations for myself (MT, 95). Hare does not believe that this involves,
in principle, impossible comparisons. On the contrary, he claims that a11
intersubjective CQnflicts of preferences are resolvable in the same way in
which a given individual settles his or her own conflicts. Just as anyone is
able to rationally determine what he or she most prefers, despite conflicting
leanings, so it is possible to pool the preferences of many persons through
hypothetical identification and to weigh them in terms of intensity (MT,
110). Hare concludes that rational choice as determined by the logic ofmoral
concepts is that of choice guided by the principle of utility.
Hare's contention that utilitarianism can be derived from the logic of
moral words depends on his account of the moral viewpoint as astandpoint
for critical thinking. Hare's moral theory is in this way structura11y parallel
to Kant's Groundwork. Just as Kant sought in the third part of the
Groundwork to show that the principle of autonomy constitutes a ground
for moral action rather than a purely logical possibility, so Hare's analysis
of the moral point of view given in Moral Thinking is designed to show that
the link between morallanguage and utilitarianism established in Freedom
and Reason is not merely the result of one mode of analysis but reflects our
actual moral thinking. Just as Kant was faced with the task of showing
that moral autonomy is consistent with the myriad ways in which we are
sensibly determined, so Hare is faced with the task of showing how utili-
tarianism is the basic requirement of moral thought, despite the fact that
many of our moral sentiments are doubtlessly non-utilitarian and even
anti-utilitarian. Finally, just as Kant succeeded by distinguishing between
the standpoint of noumenal and phenomenal subjectivity, identifying mo-
rality with the former, so Hare distinguishes between two levels of moral
thinking, the level of intuitive moral thought exemplified by most moral
conduct and critical moral thought which is the product of thorough-going
philosophical reflection.
Critical thinking, for Hare, is directed toward the question of justifica-
tion. The question ofjustification generally arises when our intuitive moral
principles give conflicting counsel in a given situation of choice (MT, 45).
The only standpoint from which such a conflict can be resolved is that
determined by the principle of utility. Hare conceives utilitarianism as an
ideal of moral thinking represented by an "archangei" endowed with fuB
knowledge ofthe facts, perfect powers ofthought, and no humanweaknesses
(MT, 44). With perfect knowledge of the logical requirements of moral
thinking and ofthe facts, the archangel will fully represent the perspectives
of each person affected by a proposed act. Not being archangels, we have
neither the knowledge of the facts nor the perfections of intellect and
character which insure the archangel's success as a moral reasoner. For
purposes of everyday moral choice, we are better off retaining prima facie
principles which seem intuitively right. These principles are general yet
clear enough to serve as guides for moral choice when time for reflection is
not available or when character is weak (MT, 36-38). Since our moral
education is based on prima {acie principles, it is to be expected that many
of our moral intuitions run counter to the principle of utility. There are,
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nevertheless, Hare argues, good utilitarian reasons for continuing to culti-
vate such intuitions. On the whole, we are more likely to act in ways
consistent with the method of critical thought by acting on intuitive princi-
pIes: if we try to carry out critical thinking in the context of action, we are
prone to rig the results so that they come out in our favor. When we are
removed from the immediate context of action and have both the time and
the dispassion to reflect clearly, we can better judge by means of critical
thinking what the correct thing to do would be. Critieal thinking always
attempts to formulate prineiples for maximizing the satisfaetion of prefer-
enees. While its principles can be entirely specifie to the eontext of action
when described in its universal features, given our human limits, the most
valuable role eritical thinking plays is in justifying prima facie, Le., in
determining which prineiples will on the whole satisfy the preferenees of
most of us when held with fmn intuitive eonvietion.
The central argument of Moral Thinking has drawn a great deal of
eontroversy. Hare argues that when reasoning is not flawed, all of us are
constrained, on the basis of logic and the facts, to draw the same moral
conclusions (MT, 6). A note of frustration at being misunderstood comes
through clearly: "I shall be doing what will seem, to those who do not
understand quite what is going on, to be very like retracting that view [Le.,
that preseriptivity is always an element of moral thinking]" (MT, 6). Be-
cause the notions of preference and ehoiee underlie Hare's concept of
prescriptivity, Hare thinks his analysis has been misconstrued as a form of
subjectivism. Hare notes that although it is often maintained as an objec-
tion to this theory ofmoral judgment that to be an objectivist one must hold
that moral right is independent of the attitudes or inclinations of any
particular speaker, it is, in fact, preeisely in this 'sense that he is an
objectivist(MT, 208 fn.). Given the logic ofmoral concepts, moraljudgments
must be universalizable; moral right, therefore, must be independent ofthe
preferences of any individual. At the same time, given the requirement that
moral right is prescriptive, it must essentially be conceived as a choice based
on the preferences of all those affected; moral right can never, for Hare, be
independent of preferences in general.
To insure that preference plays a constitutive role in moral thinking,
despite its objectivistic character, Hare introduces two considerations about
human freedom into his argument: first, it is possible to adopt an amoralist
stance; and second, the concept of selfitself contains an irreducibly prescrip-
tive component. While perfect knowledge of the logic of moral words and of
the facts compels universal assent to identical moral conelusions, this is the
ease only if one decides to engage in moral thinking at all. Logic does not
compel us to acknowledge any universal prescriptions; amoralism is areal
option (MT, 183). Moreover, the facts of primary relevance for moral
judgments are themselves prescriptions rather than descriptive features of
the context of moral action. To call someone "I" is to give particular weight
to the satisfaction of that person's preferences (MT, 96-97). In the course
of universalizing our prescriptions, we must hypothetically identify with
another "I," and to do so entails that we prescribe that the other I's
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preferences be satisfied. Since the word "I" is irreducibly prescriptive,
Hare's central argument does not merely proceed from descriptive facts
about the preferences of persons to prescriptive conclusions. The premisses
coneerning the preferenees of persons themselves contain prescriptions.
Still, on Hare's critieal method it appears that ifwe wish to aet morally,
we are only free to seek to maximize the satisfaction ofpreferences, and that
if we are fully informed and rational, there will only be one way to do this.
While coneedingthis conclusion, Hare insists that freedom is always present
in the formation of preferences. Even if his arguments for the amoralist
escape-route and the prescriptive nature ofthe "I" are rejected as unsound,
we are in any ease, Hare claims, "free to prefer what we prefer" (MT, 225).
Apart from considerations ofcoherenee, our rational choice at any particular
time will only be "a function of our separate and perhaps eonflieting
preferences and their respective intensities and of nothing else" (MT, 225).
Hare admits that universalizability does substantially curtail our freedom
to prefer what we prefer in the sense that in moral thinking the preferences
of others are given the same weight as our own; still, universalizability does
not dictate what the eontent of preferences must be. Universalizability
simply directs us to impartially maximize preferences. When we pursue
the moral question, What ought I to do? we are ultimately referred back to
those principles constitutive ofour way of life, the principles which establish
the limits of our awareness of our alternatives and, hence, the limits of
freedom. For Hare, the limits of our ways of life are determined by reason,
specifically by the interest of reason in justification. Freedom is not merely
the possibility of choosing at random between alternatives; it is the aware-
ness of the limits of the possibilities for action set by reason. The moral
point of view for Hare, as weB as for Kant, is the position of free persons
who guide their aetions on the basis of objective reasons. It is in the
understanding of how reasons are justified as objective which separates
them.
111
Rawls develops an alternative to utilitarianism by reinterpreting Kant's
coneept of autonomy as the foundation of a theory of social justice. Like
Hare, Rawls seeks to provide a method for resolving eonflicts between our
intuitive moral principles; unlike Hare, Rawls's method, far from maximiz-
ing given preferences, abstracts from these preferences to arrive at prinei-
pIes for regulating the social structures which give rise to preferenees in the
fIrst place. Rawls's relation to Kant is complex. Rawls rejects Kant's
attempt to ground the principle of autonomy in the structure of pure
praetical reason but gives the principle the eentral role allotted it in the
Groundwork. Rawls puts the principle of autonomy to work in a basieally
empirical theory which, however removed from Kant's moral methodology,
nonetheless follows the structure of Kant's Groundwork.
For Rawls, as for Kant, the examination of the moral judgment forms
the point of departure for moral theory. The question of the truth or falsity
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of the moral judgment, which for Kant motivates the philosophical inquiry
into morality, is initially put into brackets by Rawls.2 The question of moral
truth, Rawls believes, has been long and fruitlessly pursued. Progress in
resolving it, he suggests, depends on a more adequate investigation of the
actual structure of our moral conceptions than has hitherto been under-
taken. Once our moral framework has been explicated, we may return to
the question of moral truth.3 Rawls conceives this question in pragmatic
fashion as a question of the adequacy of the moral framework as a whole to
advance human interests. Unlike Rare, who takes the desirability of acting
on moral principles for granted, Rawls takes radical critiques of our moral
framework seriously, particularly those of Freud and Marx (TJ, 514, 489).
To show that our moral conceptions are not malevolent, it is necessary to
link the desire to act on moral principles with the advance of human
interests conceived along the lines of what Mill called "utility in the largest
sense, grounded in the permanent interests ofman as a progressive being.,,4
This link is established by means of an interpretation of the moral senti-
ments which shows their role in preserving a public conception of justice in
a democratic society. Since the adequacy of any interpretation rests on its
ability to account for the data, and since the data ofmoral theory consist in
our moral judgments, the test of Rawls's moral theory is its adequacy in
accounting for our moral judgments. Therefore, although Rawls, like Kant,
starts with an investigation of the moral judgment, he is committed to
viewing these judgments in such a manner that their truth-claim is brack-
eted.
Rawls's empiricistic method is so radically opposed to Kant's as to raise
doubts about the propriety ofRawls's identification ofhis theory as "Kantian
constructivism." Rawls's affinity to Kant is not methodological but struc-
tural, the structure being that of Kant's Groundwork. Rawls, like Kant in
section one of the Groundwork, concludes his inquiry into the moral judg-
ment with the identification of its formal rule. Like Kant in the second
section, Rawls uses this formal rule to derive moral principles. Finally,
following the pattern set in the third section of the Groundwork, Rawls
grounds the moral point of view in an account of the structure of practical
reason. Naturally, given Rawls's underlying empiricism, his account of
practical reason, just as his accounts of the principles of morality and the
rule of moral judgment, must be radically different from Kant's. Nonethe-
less, the employment of the Groundwork pattern guides Rawls's inquiry,
justifying his characterization of his project as Kantian constructivism.
Kantian constructivism is explicitly posed by Rawls as an alternative to
intuitionism, the doctrine which conceives moral judgments as implying
2 John Rawls, 'The Independence ofMoral Theory," Proceedings and Addresses ofthe
Amencan Philosophical Association 47 (1974·75): 7.
3 Ibid.
4 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company,
1978),10.
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truth-elaims of a unique sort. The problem of intuitionism is iHustrated by
Kant's inquiry in the fIrst part of the Groundwork. There Kant treated the
moral judgment as making a truth-claim that implies the requirement that
one do one's duty for its own sake. This doetrine of what Rawls ealls the
purely eonseientious act raises questions not only about the rationality of
moral eonduct but about its eoherence sinee we are subjeet to a variety of
duties which appear at times to commit us to eonflicting lines of conduet.
The eonsequenee of this confliet, as Kant himself saw, was the eonversion
of moral requirements into mere hypotheses concerning the advanee of
non-moral ends and the seemingly hopeless dialeetic of ordinary moral
eonsciousness CG, 405). The transformation of moral requirements from
universal preseriptions of prima faeie assumptions eoneerning the general
welfare is aptly illustrated by Rare. Rawls, by eontrast, seeks to retain the
striet charaeter of moral precepts, while avoiding the dialeetie between
moral and non-moral eonsiderations deseribed by Kant. Rawls's solution is
to conceive moral requirements as eonditions for the choice of moral prinei-
pIes. These eonditions will vary with the nature ofthe ehoiee-problem, but
they will remain the same insofar as they artieulate a general eoneeption
about the nature of moral principles. Moral prineiples serve to resolve
eonfliets of inter~st between individuals. In order to serve this funetion,
they must rest on eonditions which eould be agreed to in advance by the
parties in the dispute, at least insofar as all are willing to be reasonable.
The formal rule of moral judgment, for Rawls, is one of fairness. Moral
prineiples are ones chosen under conditions whieh are fair, given the nature
of the choice-problem at hand.
To identify fair eonditions for the ehoice of moral prineiples, it is not
suffieient to appeal to the moral preeepts which we happen to have at hand
sinee these maythemselves refleet speeifie soeial interests. Rather, we must
ultimately abstract to a situation in which the parties are ignorant not only
oftheir social positions and natural endowments but oftheir plaee in history
as weH. The initial situation offairness is reminiseent ofthe social eontract
of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century political thought, but as eoneeived
by Rawls it is a pure hypothesis having to do with eireumstanees in which
a fair agreement ean be reached about moral prineiples. Autonomy is
central to Rawls's aceount ofthese eircumstances. Assuming, as Rawls does,
that the identity of persons is indeterminable apart from their place in a
given social structure, moral autonomy, if it were possible, would eonsist in
detaching oneself from a11 knowledge apart from that necessary to affmn
principles of justice. Autonomy represents the standpoint taken by any
individual who seeks to regulate the social structure by moral prineiples
eo11eetively agreed upon.
The bulk of A Theory ofJustice eonsists in Rawls's interpretation of the
initial situation, his aeeount ofthe prineiples that would be adopted within
it, and his proof that the principles adopted are capable of regulating the
soeial strueture of a modern, industrial demoeratie state. The primacy of
the question of social justice reflects Rawls's belief in the soeial nature of
persons. The interests of persons as weIl as their eharacters are, Rawls
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writes, determined by the institutional agreements within which they find
themselves.5 What we would be apart from our social institutions is, Rawls
claims, unknown and probably unknowable.6 Although Rawls's conception
of the person would not seem to leave much room for private morality, Rawls
contends that the same strategy by which principles of social justice are
derived may be adapted to the problem of determining principles for
individuals. Although it is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to
examine Rawls's specific derivation of moral principles, it is important to
note that Rawls provides a comprehensive aecount of moral reality, and we
may inquire into the nature of that reality.
Rawls's employment of a pure hypothesis as the means for deriving
moral principles gives his theory an almost fictional charaeter. What
interest, apart from the literary, can I take in the imaginary deliberations
of hypothetical subjects .in a highly contrived situation of ehoice? The
problem is similar to that which Kant faced in the beginning of the third
section ofthe Groundwork. Granted that our moral deliberations only make
sense if they are conceived as the product of a self-regulating will, why
should I believe that I have such a will? Kant's answer to this question is
to explieate the moral standpoint as the perspective of noumenal subjectiv-
ity. But this solution is rejected by Rawls on both theoretical and practical
grounds. Moral theory, Rawls holds, should not lead us to posit entities
other than those required to explicate the data. Moreover, the coherence of
moral theory with other sciences of the human being prohibits the employ-
ment of radically distinet methods of inquiry. Finally, Kant's distinction of
standpoints fails to explain how the self-Iegislating activity of the saint is
to be distinguished from that of the scoundrel since both would seem to
equally express noumenal subjectivity (TJ, 254-55).
Rawls's critique of Kant allows us to highlight his own aceount of the
grounds of morality. For Rawls, as for Kant, morality is a pure posit. But
whereas Kant conceives this posit in terms ofthe self-Iegislating activity of
the individual moral agent, Rawls conceives it in terms of the activity of
moral theory-construction. The interest of Rawls's theory lies in the as-
sumption that through moral theory-eonstruction we ean both overcome
the limits of the social morality we are born into and, by doing so, represent
new possibilities for reconciling the conflicting interests of persons. This
assumption rests on Rawls's conception of the moral judgment. The moral
judgment, for Rawls, may be the datum of moral theory, but this datum is
"soft" in the sense that it can be revised as a result of theory-construction.
The moral theorist is free to make any and an adjustments necessary to
attain systematic coherence.7 By going back and forth between explanatory
5 John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal ofPhilosophy 77
(1980): 538.
6 John Rawls, "The Basic Structure as Subject," in Values and Morals, eds. A.I.
Goldman and J. Kiln (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 56.
7 Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory", 8.
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hypotheses about the conditions of moral choice and the judgments--em-
ploying what Rawls calls the method ofreflective equilibrium-an adequate
account of our moral framework is obtained.
But why should I care about the reflective equilibrium attained by moral
theory between principles and judgments unless both happen to be mine?
The data of moral theory, one might think, can change in light of knowledge
of their principles only if both belong to the same person.8 Rawls's reply is
given in his Kantian interpretation of the initial situation. For Rawls, to
the extent that moral theory explains our moral capacity, it must represent
a conception that commands our allegiance. The task of the Kantian
interpretation is to persuade us that Rawls's moral theory affirms a self-
conception that we, in fact, desire to express. Rawls identifies three ele-
ments as essential to this self-conception, the ideas of morality, freedom,
and equality.9
Rawls's theory claims to improve our moral competence: through reflec-
tive equilibrium our moral scheme comes to fit together as a coherent whole,
and this whole is rightly seen as the expression of our Kantian self-concep-
tion. Moreover, moral theory provides the means by which social coopera-
tion can be made to proceed on a fair basis. Therefore, although Rawls does
not, like Kant, ground his moral doctrine in a theory of reason as apower
of self-determination, he does view moral theory-construction as an exercise
in human self-determination. Moral autonomy is the central concept in
Rawls's theory not merely as it is represented in the thought-experiment
articulating fair conditions of moral choice but as it represents the stand-
point of the moral theorist-ultimately any individual-as constituting
moral reality through the method of reflective equilibrium.
IV
Having reviewed the structural parallel between Hare's and Rawls's
theories and Kant's Groundwork, it must be asked, in view ofthe extent to
which Kant's original project is altered, in what sense Hare and Rawls may
be said to belong to the Kantian tradition. The Kantian tradition in moral
philosophy is characterized by an emphasis on moral freedom. Although
this concept doubtlessly plays a central role in Hare's and Rawls's theories,
it is unlikely that Kant would recognize their conceptions as having much
to do with his own. For Kant, freedom is essentially connected with a
concept of reason as apower of self-determination. Hare and Rawls offer
alternative accounts of reason, but these faH to show the intimate connec-
tion, argued by Kant, between freedom and reason. At most they can
establish the compatibility of freedom and reason under certain highly
8 I owe this objection to Ernst Tugendhat, "Comments on Some Methodological
Aspects of Rawls's Theory of Justice," Analyse & Kritik 1 (1979): 78-79.
9 Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," 553-54.
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idealized conditions. A defense of human freedom in moral life is the
principal point of Hare's and Rawls's theories, but Kant would elearly not
aceept either theory as providing a justifieation for the belief in moral
freedom. He would view their theories as elaborate rationalizations for a
belief in freedom that is not rationally sustained. For Kant, freedom is tied
to a coneept ofreason that consists essentially in selfdetermination. Hare's
and Rawls's theories reinterpret self-determining reason in ways which,
they believe, capture the essence of Kant's concept of reason, but neither
articulates a moral theory based on prineiples of autonomy as such. Instead
they offer substitutes and then argue that their alternative moral principles
are compatible with a belief in autonomy.
Any attempt to ground morality on Kant's theory of reason is subjeet to
an objection fIrst formulated by Hegel and tacitly acknowledged by Hare
and Rawls. Aceording to Hegel, Kant's theory of reason gives rise to an
ethics of inner intention so utterly divorced from the soeial world in which
moral agents live and act so as to be unable to gain the foothold necessary
to pronounce on the rightness and wrongness of eoncrete moral acts.
Knowledge of right and duty are, Hegel believes, essential for moral life.
But Kant, by abstracting the moral will from any possible content of moral
aets, makes knowledge of duty impossible. Moreover, Kant's test ofuniver-
salization, Hegel argues, merely serves to justify what is already assumed
to be right since it presupposes the legitimacy of the institutional context
to whieh the proposed aet belongs. For example, in examining the maxim
that a deposit for which there is no proof must be returned, Kant presup-
poses the legitimaey of property relations in the specific form of deposits.
Kant's universalization test, Hegel coneludes, yields definite results only if
one assurnes thai the institutions, habits, and customs which form the
context of moral action are legitimate in the first place. Any maxim can be
justified by means of Kant's test, provided the agent makes the necessary
assumptions. Consistency would provide some constraints on the will
purporting to be rational-to accept the maxim of not respecting deposits
has implications for the institution of property as a whole-but pure reason
as a formal and abstract principle of the will does not dictate that any
particular institution, with a11 the maxims proper to it, must belong to the
moral universe.10
Hare and Rawls implicitly aeknowledge Hegers criticisms ofthe abstract
and empty character of Kant's self-determining will. Both seareh for ways
to provide their theories with determinate content and so avoid the charge
offormalism. Yet they attempt to avoid this objection in very different ways:
Hare by means of his version of utilitarianism and Rawls by emphasizing
the social charaeter of persons.
lOHegel, Natural Law, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1975), 77.
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Hare's version of utilitarianism contains formal and substantive ele-
ments. The formal element rests on Hare's account ofthe logical properties
of moral words and grounds the principle of utility. The use of moral
language commits one to the principle that the preferences of a11 persons
affected by a proposed act be determined and counted equa11y. The principle
ofutility provides, in Hare's theory, determinate content for moral delibera-
tion. It does so, however, in a purely formal way: directingus to the relevant
data, the principle does not, taken in isolation, determine moral choice. It
is only after examining the actual preferences of persons that deliberation
grounded by the principle of utility yields a specific result. Hare is quite
clear that the determination of moral right is, ultimately, an empirical
matter (MT, 5). The substantive element of moral theory on Hare's account
rests on empirical investigation. As Hare writes, it is empirical inquiry that
"brings our moral thinking into contact with the world of reality" (MT, 5).
Apart from its ability to incorporate the results of empirical investigation
into the actual preferences of persons, Hare's moral theory, by his own
admission, would lack practical force. A purely logical inquiry into the
meaning of morallanguage can never, on Hare's view, provide an answer to
the question, What should I do?
Rawls characterizes Kant's concept of autonomy as "purelytranscendent
and lacking explicable connections with human conduct" (TJ, 256). Rawls
suggests that his moral theory shows this connection can be made. Auton-
orny, in Rawls's theory, comes to be understood primarily in terms of the
perspective of the moral theorist who is an empirical investigator seeking
to identify the conditions for the choice of moral principles which will
explicate our moral judgments. These conditions must, given their explana-
tory character, reflect the actual circumstances of human life. Moral
theories such as Kant's which claim to establish principles which hold for
a11 possible worlds must be empty for Rawls. "From the point of view of
contract theory it amounts to supposing that the persons in the original
position know nothing at a11 about themselves or their world. How, then,
can they possibly make adecision? (TJ, 159)"
Rawls incorporates a Heglian element into his Kantian constructivism
by acknowledging the primacy of social morality. It is this primacy which
underlies Rawls's decision to begin his inquiry with the question of social
justice rather than, as was the case with Kant, the question of individual
obligation or duty. Rawls, moreover, assuming the social nature of persons,
concludes that the Kantian conception of self underlying his conception of
justice can only be realized when a just institutional arrangement exists.
[Kant] seems to think that the conception of ourselves as fully
autonomous is already given to us by ... our recognition that the
morallaw is supremely authoritative for us as ... rational beings.
Thus this conception of ourselves is implicit in individual moral
consciousness, and the background social co~<!~ti~~~_{<!~ _
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its realization are not emphasized or made part of the moral
doctrine itself.11
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iFor Rawls, by eontrast, no explanation of moral eonseiousness is eomplete
!which faHs to delineate the structure of the institutional arrangement that
makes it possible. It is not simply that Rawls acknowledges to a greater
degree than Kant that our social relations have implieations for our eoncep-
tion of self; Rawls contends that our self-conception arises in and through
these relations.12 By emphasizing the dependence of our self-eonceptions
on background soeial eonditions, Rawls implies that the Kantian concept of
the moral subject has emerged historically. The very possibility of moral
theory as construed by Rawls depends on historical eonditions.
v
Hare and Rawls both attempt to avoid Kant's problem offormalism, but
to do so in a way that acknowledges the freedom of the moral subject. Yet
both theories abandon Kant's coneeption ofthe moral subject as an autono-
mous, rational agent and, from Kant's perspective, regress to a eonception
of the moral agent as subjeet to laws which proceed independently of his or
her will. Whatever Hare's and Rawls's suceess in generating determinate
answers to moral questions, it is doubtful whether their theories ean be
considered to advanee the Kantian position since these answers cannot be
construed as the dictates of an autonomous moral subjeet.
Hare comes close to conceding the necessity of heteronomy. Still, Hare's
ideal moral reasoner, the archangel, deliberates in light of the de facto
preferences of those affeeted by a particular course of action, regardless of
their source. Heteronomy in Hare ia not merely a concession to human
limitation but an implieation ofmoral reasoning as such. The limits ofmoral
reasoning are set by desire, regardless of whether the desire in question is
itself the produet of autonomy or established in some other way.
In Rawls's ease, the heteronomy ofthe moral point ofview is less readily
diseemible, but only because his theory is more complex than Hare's. If one
does not grasp the whole, Rawls's theory can be read as an elaborate model
of how society ean be understood as founded on the right of individuals to
be reeognized as free, equal, and moral, thereby preserving what Hegel,
among others, took to be the eore of Kant's eoncept of autonomy.13 But in
rejecting Kant's distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom,
Rawls implies the heteronomy ofthe moral will. Rawls's conception ofmoral
theory as an explanatory theory like any other assumes that moral activity
11 Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," 553-54.
12Ibid.,568-69.
13Hegel, Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. J. Simson
(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974), 111, 549.
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can be conceived within the totality of nature. For Rawls, moral theory is
part of an encompassing "theory of the natural order and our place it in"
(TJ, 512). Rawls goes so far as to suggest that the "Kantian" concept ofthe
self as a moral subject is ultimately a biological response to our environ-
ment.
The theory of evolution would suggest that...the capacity for a
sense of justice and the moral feelings is an adaptation of
mankind to its place in nature. . . .It seems elear that for
members of a species which lives in stable soeial groups, the
ability to eomply with fair eooperative arrangements and to
develop the sentiments necessary to support them is highly
advantageous. (TJ,503)
Rawls's underlying naturalism is further i11ustrated by his claim that "the
principles ofjustice are eloser to the tendency of evolution than the principle
of utility" (TJ, 503). Such statements show that although Rawls does not
assert the heteronomy of the will in Hare's manner by allowing individual
preferences to determine moral deliberation, he has nonetheless failed to
develop a concept of society whieh ean itself be understood as the eonerete
association of autonomous subject.
VI
Although neither Rare nor Rawls succeeds in developing variants ofthe
Groundwork project which at once avoid the charge of formalism and
preserve Kant's eonception of the moral point of view as the standpoint of
the self-determining subject, Rawls in particular provides the clue for what
is needed for suceess. Rawls's theory of justice, detaehed from his underly-
ing naturalism, takes the moral subject as the foundation of a11 social
relations. Whereas partieular moral acts are conditioned by social prac-
tiees, subjectivity, in the form ofour Kantian conception ofself, is, for Rawls,
the prineiple informing our soeial institutions to the extent that they are
just. What is needed to escape heteronomy, given this starting point, is the
development of the eoncepts of the person and society as shaped by freedom,
where freedom is not in turn understood as the product of natural forces
but rather as the eoncrete unity of sociallife. Rawls's contention that moral
theory ean have practical import only if it has implieations for our under-
standing of soeial institutions and praetices is sound. But the soeial order
foundational for our understanding of morality must itself be actually
affIrIIled by subjeets and not merely capable of being conceived as if it were
affIrIIled. Unless we start with the aetual affirmations of the social order
by persons, through their practiees, then we will have no grounds, given the
social nature of persons, to afflrIll their autonomy. Only such a soeial
\conception advances the Groundwork projeet by overcoming the problem of
formalism without, at the same time, abolishing the autonomous subjeet.
\ -------------------
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If understanding the freedom of human activity depends on under-
standing the social order which forms its ultimate context, then a positive
conception of freedom might be developed through an account of the virtues
proper to basic social practices. Such a concept, once elaborated, would
enrich the three phases of the Groundwork project in the following ways.
The account of moral rules given in the fIrst phase could be supplemented
with an account of rules exhibiting how virtues are developed within
particular practices.14 The account of the supreme principle constitutive of
morality could be enriched by a concept of justification which assesses the
role of practices within political traditions, i.e., which assesses whether the
virtues practices require and Fromote are positive or negative forces in the
development of a tradition.1 And, finally, the theory of reason which
establishes the possibility of the moral point of view should make sense of
the perspective from which we shape complete lives within society, Le., the
perspective from which we shape our personal identities.16
Assuming that out conception of morality depends on our actual social
relations, the notion of the Kantian subject must be understood in a social
context. But our account ofthis context must be consistent with the freedom
ofthe subject. This is only possible ifthe subject is represented as a positive
determiner of its social relations and, ultimately, of itself. Hare and Rawls
articulate alternative ideas of freedom. But the freedom to prefer what we
prefer or to entertain a self-conception that we cannot posit as real does not
make the possibility of autonomy as established by Kant's Groundwork
determinate. On the contrary, the arguments of Hare and Rawls, if valid,
would show Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy to be impossible.
Sacred Heart University,
Fairfield, Connecticut
14Cf. Günther Maluschke, "Universalisierbarkeit und Institutionalisierbarkeit
sittlicher und politischer Normer,"in NormenbegTÜndung- Normendurchsetzung, ed.
Willi Oelmuller (Paderbom: Schoningh, 1978).
15Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue: A Study in Moral Thinking takes a step in this
direction (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
16This problematic is discussed in Klaus Hartmann's "Moralitat und 'konkretes
Allgemeines'," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (1978). Cf. also his "Towards
a New Systematic Reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in The State and Civil
Society, ed. Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
